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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
wife would end up receiving approximately three-quarters of her
contribution to the community property. Although an adjustment
might be made in the case of a divorce, there could be no adjustment
if the community were terminated by death.22
Implicit in the principal case is a questioning of the validity of
"marital bankruptcy." There is considerable doubt whether "marital
bankruptcy" is suited to modern society, and there have been informal
proposals to eliminate the doctrine.23 "Marital bankruptcy" originated
in the Spanish community property law, in which it was considered that
the well-being and interest of the family were superior to the rights of
creditors. 4 Such a doctrine was appropriate for the social and eco-
nomic environment in which the concepts of community property
developed. The interest and well-being of the family are still signifi-
cant, but the conditions that fostered "marital bankruptcy" may no
longer be present. Government welfare machinery and private charities
provide substantial protection against the consequences of failure to
protect the family. In addition, doctrines that add instability and un-
certainty to credit transactions in a credit-oriented economy are incon-
sistent with the nature of that economy. Although "marital bank-
ruptcy" does not seem well-adapted to the contemporary society, the
proper remedial device is not the creation of ill-defined, piecemeal
exceptions, but rather correction through comprehensive statutory
change.
TAXATION OF CORPORATE STOCK RECEIVED BY
SOLE SHAREHOLDERS UPON CANCELLATION
OF SALARY OBLIGATIONS
Randall and Fender, sole and equal shareholders of Fender Sales,
Inc., twice cancelled equal salary debts owned to them by their corpor-
ation.' As part of these transactions, the corporation issued $100 par
value common stock for each $100 of salary debt owed. Neither the
22 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.110 (1958) (divorce), with WASH. REv.
CODE § 11.04.050 (1956) (death).
23 BROCKELBANK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 284-85; SPEER, LAW OF MARiTAL RIGHTS
IN TEXAS § 385 (3d ed. 1929) ; Cross, supra note 10, at 667; Cross, Law Revision in
Washington, 27 WASH. L. REv. 193, 196 (1952).2 4 BROCKELBANK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 284; DE FuNIAK, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 441.
'The transactions in question grew out of a suggestion by a bank-creditor of the
corporation that its salary liabilities to Randall and Fender be capitalized in order to
avoid potential priority over the bank's claim.
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corporation, which had previously deducted the salary liabilities as
expenses for federal income tax purposes, nor the individuals, who were
cash basis taxpayers, reported any income as a result of these transac-
tions. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the re-
ceipt of stock constituted taxable salary income to the individuals or,
alternatively, that the cancellation resulted in income to the corpora-
tion. The Tax Court held that the transactions did not affect the tax-
able income of either the individual or the corporation.2 On appeal by
the Commissioner, reversed and held: Voluntary relinquishment by
sole shareholders of salary debts owed to them by their corporation
constitutes realization of income to the shareholder-creditors to the
extent of the value of the obligations discharged; receipt of stock
by employees in discharge of salary obligations owed to them con-
stitutes a realization of income by the employees in the amount of
the fair market value of the stock.' Commissioner v. Fender Sales,
Inc., 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).'
Under existing authority, a corporation does not realize taxable
income when a shareholder-creditor gratuitously cancels a corporate
obligation owed to him.' Rather, such cancellation is construed to be a
contribution to capital. Consequently, a corporation may realize an
unwarranted tax benefit by accruing and deducting expenses which
it never pays. No prior decision has held that a shareholder-creditor
realizes taxable income upon the voluntary relinquishment of a salary
claim.' The additional factor of stock issuance as part of the can-
'Fender Sales, Inc., 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mene. 1 63,119 at 634 (1963) :
Fender and Randall were the sole shareholders of Sales regardless of whether they
each owned 50 shares or 1,000 shares. Their wealth was no more increased by
the issuance of additional shares than if the corporation had caused its stock to
be split 20 for 1. The issuance of such additional shares to Fender and Randall
did not constitute income to them within the meaning of the 16th Amendment
to the Constitution regardless of whether it represented a stock dividend or
represented compensation for services. Eisner v. Macomber [252 U.S. 189(1920) ]. See also Deloss E. Daggitt, 23 T.C. 31 (1954).
Speaking to the Commissioner's alternative argument, the court states, 338 F.2d
at 930:
Whether viewed as payments for stock of the corporation or as the forgiveness
by the shareholders of debts owed to them by the corporation, the transactions
were nontaxable payments or contributions to capital from the point of view of
the corporation's tax liability. 26 U.S.C. § 118; I.R.C. 1032(a); Reg. 1.1032-1 ;
Reg. 1.61-12(a); Carroll-McCreary Co., Inc. v. Commissioner (2 CCA 1941),
124 F.2d 303; Helvering v. American Dental Co., 1943, 318 U.S. 322...; Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co. (2 CCA 1934),
74 F.2d 226, 227.
'33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1142 (1965); 64 MicHi. L. Rav. 138 (1965); 20 RuTmGs
L. Rav. 130 (1965).
' See notes 18-22 infra, and accompanying text.
'In John Harvey Kellogg, 2 T.C. 1126 (1943), acq., 1944-1 Cum. BuL. 16, an
officer and board member of a charitable non-stock corporation waived his salary
claims. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that, under Helvering v.
1966]
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cellation transaction would not modify the nontaxable result to either
the corporation7 or the shareholder-creditor.8 In deciding to tax the
shareholder-creditors, the court in the principal case failed to fill the
gap in present tax law which permits a corporation to reduce its tax
burden without the expenditure of funds. In addition, the court
created doubt as to the tax incidents of debt cancellation.
Citing existing authority, the court in the principal case stated,
without discussion, that no taxable income was realized by the cor-
poration either upon cancellation of the accrued and deducted salary
obligations or upon the issuance of stock in discharge of such obliga-
tions.' As to the shareholders, however, the court stated its disagree-
ment with the theory that cancellation of a debt "which, if collected,
would represent taxable income, is, in all circumstances, a non-taxable
event,' ° and reasoned that, when the taxpayers
... voluntarily elected to exercise their dominion and control over the
choses in action.., for unpaid salaries by extinguishing them for the
benefit of the corporation, of which they were sole owners, thereby
augmenting the intrinsic worth of the capital stock they held...
[they] "realized" for their own benefit the value of the obligations dis-
charged .... 11
In so concluding, the court relied principally on the broad "power and
American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943), and Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940), the creditor realized income and stated, 2 T.C. at 1127:
When we come to apply the Commissioner's conception to the numerous easily
imagined situations in which actual receipt or accrual would be constructed out
of conduct amounting to realization because of satisfactions or enjoyments, there
is a prohibitive difficulty in keeping the conception within rational limits. We
find no authority in the revenue act for treating the relinquishment of an indebt-
edness by a cash basis creditor to his debtor as a realization of income by the
creditor.
3 P.H. 1966 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 7.392 states, "Apparently a creditor does not receive
income by relinquishing his debtor's debt," citing Kellogg and Helvering v. Jane
Holding Corp., 109 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1940).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1032(a) (no gain or loss recognized to a corporation
on receipt of money or other property in exchange for stock of such corporation).
8 Gross income includes the fair market value of stock received by an employee
as compensation for services. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61-a(l); Treas. Reg. §
1.61-2(d) (4) (1957). But it does not "include the amount of any distribution made
by a corporation to its shareholders with respect to the stock of such corporation...."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 305-a; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). When a
pro rata distribution of stock was made as payment for services rendered by share-
holder-employees, the courts held that no income was realized by the recipient. Joy
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1956), affirming 23 T.C. 1082
(1955), 70 HARv. L. Rxv. 560 (1957); Deloss E. Daggit, 23 T.C. 31 (1954), acq.,
1955-1 Curm. BuLL. 4; Note, Application of Einer v. Macomber to Pro Rata Stock
Distributions in Payment of Salaries: an Opportunity for Tax Manipulation, 64
YALE L. J. 929 (1955) ; Jacksonville Paper Co., 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 728 (1954);
Benjamin Josephson, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (1947).
' See note 3 supra.
10 338 F.2d at 928.
n Id. at 929.
[VOL. 41
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
control" concepts of income realization enunciated in Helvering v.
Horst."2 As to the stock issuance, the court decided that the share-
holders had realized income because the stock received was compen-
sation for services rendered, 3 and not merely a nontaxable stock
dividend.14 Rejecting the shareholders' argument that they had not,
in fact, been compensated by receipt of the additional shares of
stock," the court reasoned that, as a result of the debt cancellation,
"the corporation was a substantially different corporation after the
transaction than before" in that its net worth had been increased,
and that the shareholders did, therefore, "receive something of value
constituting taxable income under the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution"' 6 when they received the additional shares of stock.
In dealing with the issue of debt cancellation vis-h-vis the corpora-
tion, the court in the principal case chose to follow precedent rather
than policy. Ordinarily, cancellation of a debt will result in taxable
income to the debtor.'7 However, if cancellation of a corporate debt
is construed to be either a gift" or contribution to capital, 9 no taxable
income will be realized by the corporation-debtor.2 0 Since the 1943
-311 U.S. 112 (1940) (taxpayer realized income when he transferred interest
coupons from bonds to his son, the son subsequently receiving payment thereon).
The court in the principal case stated, 338 F. 2d at 929:
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lester, 1961, 366 U.S. 299, 304,... the
Supreme Court approvingly quoted from Horst: "The power to dispose of in-
come is the equivalent of ownership of it" We add, the exercise of the power to
dispose of income is the equivalent of the realization of it.
As authority for this proposition, the court cited INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61,
and Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (4) ("if a corporation transfers its own stock to an
employee... as compensation for services, the fair market value of the stock at the
time of transfer shall be included in the gross income of the employee...."). The
court summarily rejected the conclusions of two earlier cases that stock received
under similar circumstances by shareholder-employees was nontaxable. 338 F2d at
929. Those cases were: Deloss E. Daggit 23 T.C. 31 (1954), acq., 1955-1 Cum. BULL.
4; Benjamin Josephson, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 788 (1947).
"See text accompanying notes 37-38 infra.
The taxpayers argued that, because they were equal shareholders as well as
employees, the stock they received was not compensensation because their ownership
in the corporation was not changed by the transaction, and they therefore, "received
nothing which they did not already possess, i.e., the entire capital stock of Fender
Sales, Inc." 338 F.2d at 927.
Id. at 927.1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6 1-a(1 2 ) (except as otherwise provided, gross income
includes income derived from discharge of indebtedness); United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102-a (gross income does not include the value of
property acquired by gift); Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943)
(gratuitous cancellation of previously accrued and deducted interest and rental
indebtedness held to be a gift and not taxable income to the debtor-corporation).
"INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 118-a (gross income of a corporation does not include
any contribution to capital).
'These two exceptions to the basic "income realization" principle of § 61-a(12)
of the Code have been incorporated into Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1957), which
states,
1966]
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decision of Helvering v. American Dental Co., 2 1 the courts have
consistently held that the nontaxable consequences of such cancella-
tion transactions are not modified by the fact that the corporation-
debtor had previously deducted such obligations from its gross income
as expenses.22 This tax advantage is eliminated in those cases that
fall within the proscriptions of section 267 of the Code.3 This section
disallows deductions for expenses owed to a creditor who owns more
than fifty percent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation-
debtor, unless the expense is paid within two and one-half months
after the close of the corporation's taxable year and included within
the same period in the gross income of the shareholder. As the share-
holders in the principal case each owned only fifty percent of the
stock, the provision is inapplicable. In the original drafting of the
1954 Code, there was an attempt to provide for comprehensive treat-
ment of all transactions involving cancellation of indebtedness,2 4 but
this provision did not get out of committee. Such non-action may be
interpreted in two ways: either Congress was satisfied with the
extant line of authority which permitted corporations to realize this
tax benefit, or it was unable to arrive at a satisfactory statement
of what the law ought to be and therefore left development to the
courts and the Commissioner.
In general, if a shareholder in a corporation which is indebted to him gra-
tuitously forgives the debt, the transaction amounts to a contribution to capital
of the corporation to the extent of the principal of the debt,
and have been followed in decisions involving cancellation of salary expenses. Pond-
field Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 43-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9600 (2d Cir.), reversing
1 T.C. 217 (1943); Carroll-McCreary Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1941) ; Tanner Mfg. Co., 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 305 (1943) ; Midland Tailors, 2 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 281 (1943) ; Brown Cab Co., 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 450 (1943) ; Triple
Z Products, Inc., 40-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9705 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). But ef. Amsco-Wire
Products Corp., 44 B. T. A. 717 (1941) ; Howard Paper Co.,, 43 B. T. A. 545 (1941) ;
Beacon Auto Stores, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 703 (1940). The latter decisions were rendered
prior to Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943) (see text accompany-
ing note 21 infra), and applied the reasoning of Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109
F.2d 933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 653 (1940), that expenses deducted from
taxable income in previous years should be returned to income when cancelled. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explicitly retreated from the position that it
took in Jane Holding in Reynolds v. Boos, 188 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1951) (forgiveness
of previously deducted expense item is a gift and not income to the debtor corpora-
tion), citing American Dental for the proposition that the tax benefit theory is not
applicable to this type of transaction. For a definitive treatment of the subject, see
Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: .A Problem of
Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. REV. 225 (1959).
1318 U.S. 322 (1943).
See note 20 supra.
All "Code" references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, unless other-
,vise stated.
H. R. Res. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 76 (1954); H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). For a comprehensive statement of the proposed provisions,
see Eustice, supra note 20, at 272-74.
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Assuming, for purposes of this analysis, the validity of the latter
of these two explanations, 2a the court in the principal case might
have deviated from precedent and taxed the corporation. It could
have reasoned that, although the cancellations per se resulted in a
nontaxable gift or contribution to capital of the corporation, the prior
deductions of expenses (which now need not be paid) resulted in the
release of income not previously taxed. In so ruling, the court would
have taxed the one entity that had realized a present and tangible
benefit from the "accrual-deduction-cancellation" transactions, and,
at the same time, would have dosed an unwarranted tax loophole. Ad-
ditionally, such a ruling would have reflected the broad income tax
principles of section 61 of the Code, which provides that all income
other than that specifically excluded is subject to tax.26
Having decided not to tax the corporation, the court was faced
with the issue of whether the cancellation, alone, resulted in income
realization to the shareholder-creditors. In John Harvey Kellogg,
27
the Tax Court stated that there is "no authority in the revenue act
for treating the relinquishment of an indebtedness by a cash basis
creditor to his debtor as a realization of income by the creditor." 2
No other decision dealing with cancellation of salary claims has in-
timated a contrary conclusion.29
The court in the principal case, in its decision to tax the shareholder-
creditors, relied on the "dominion and control" rationale of Helvering
v. Horst.30 This rationale is sound when applied to assignment-of-
income cases, the proposition being that a taxpayer may not avoid
income realization by diverting what would be his income to a third
party. But the instant salary cancellations did not divert income to
a third party; they merely modified the form of the corporate interest
See Eustice, supra note 20, at 284:
One might justifiably conclude that Congress had decided to "wash its hands"
of responsibility in this area and delegate the problem to the courts and the
Commissioner to be solved in a case-by-case approach or appropriate Regula-
tions, as the case may be.
"The court would have found further support for this proposition in § 111, which
incorporates the tax benefit principle. Although this is an exclusionary provision,
the court could have argued its applicability by analogy.
2 T.C. 1126 (1943), acq., 1944-1 Cum. BULL. 16.
Id. at 1127.
The courts have, however, recognized that such cancellations result in an in-
crease in the value of the shareholder's interest in the corporation. Carroll-McCreary
Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 1941) ("an indirect benefit... always
results to the shareholder from a gift to his corporation") ; Triple Z Products, Inc.,
40-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9705 at 10,777 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) ("If it be argued that the for-
giveness was not gratuitous because the stockholder was benefited in that the equity
represented by this stock would be enhanced, the answer is that such would naturally
be the result of any contribution to the capital of the corporation.")
:'311 U.S. 112 (1940).
19661
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held by the shareholders. The taxpayers' interest in their totally owned
corporation before cancellantion was represented by both debt and
equity; their interest after cancellation was represented by equity
alone. However, the total value of this interest remained constant.
Nevertheless, the court decided that the shareholder-creditors did
realize income since the cancellation effectuated an increase in the
intrinsic worth of their capital stock." Yet shareholders of close cor-
porations constantly modify the worth of their stock, 2 and such modifi-
cations have not heretofore been taxed until there has been either a
sale, exchange, or other disposition of stock, or a dividend paid."
It is evident that the court in the principal case was concerned with
possible opportunities for tax manipulation. Arguably, a shareholder-
creditor with an enforceable salary claim against his corporation could
be in a position to convert to capital gains what would otherwise be
ordinary income. 4 By releasing the claim and subsequently selling
shares in the corporation, the income, which would have been taxed
as ordinary income if it had been paid as salaries, would be taxed at
capital gains rates. However, given the usual absence of a buying
market for the shares of a close corporation, it is unlikely that such
gain would be realized without dissolution or sale of the corporation.
If the corporation was sold and there was evidence that the share-
holders intended to sell out at the time of cancellation, the court
could look through form to substance, include the cancellation as
part of the sale transaction, and allocate a portion of the purchase
price to payment of the salary claims. 5 Such facts were not present
in the principal case.
' The court recognized the difficult valuation problems which could arise in
future cases, stating that, "fortunately, under the agreed facts of this case, we have
no problem respecting the taxable value of the income thus realized...." 338 F.2d
at 929.2 For example, by contributing property, services, and ideas to their corporation.
'Judge Barnes, in his dissenting opinion in the principal case, stated this
proposition in the following manner, 338 F.2d at 930:
This majority opinion is the first I have encountered which recognizes a
realization of income by shareholders upon an increase in corporate net worth,
where no dividend has been declared or capital gain yet realized by the share-
holders. Shareholders' interests in corporations change every day. The net worth
of corporations is in a constant state of flux. Surely, when it increases, the
shareholders are not yet deemed to have made a taxable gain. Rather the increase
in corporate net worth is merely a paper increase of the shareholders' equity, not
taxable until such time as the shareholders realize the increase by virtue of a
dividend or the sale or exchange of the security investment above cost. Then, and
only then, have the courts traditionally recognized "a taxable event."
A similar possibility already exists under current tax law. A taxpayer, by
accelerating or postponing the disposition of "§ 1231 property" may control whether
his gains or losses are subject to capital or ordinary tax treatment.
Additionally, if a corporation over an extended period of time deducts expenses
which it need never pay because of their consistent cancellation, the Commissioner
[VOL. 41
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By its decision that the creditor-shareholders realized income solely
by releasing their claims, the court created an uncertainty as to the
tax consequences of all future cancellations of obligations which, if
paid, would result in ordinary income,36 and which, when cancelled,
cause an increase in the intrinsic worth of the capital stock held.
There are many situations in which debt obligations are accrued in
good faith, and subsequently cancelled because of changes in the
financial ability of the corporation-debtor. Frequently a new corpora-
tion will be organized with the intention that part of the profits of
the corporation will be withdrawn by way of salaries rather than
dividends. Subsequent financial inability to pay such salaries, coupled
with a need for additional capital, will lead to the release of such
salary obligations by the shareholder-creditors. Such cancellations
are not motivated by an intent to reduce the tax liability of the share-
holder, but rather by the desire to help sustain the life of the corpora-
tion. Many parties other than the owners benefit from the success
of a going corporation. The tax law should not be used to discourage
good faith cancellations of corporate obligations when such transac-
tions are necessary to sustain the life of a corporation.
As to the stock issuance, the court in the principal case rejected
Eisner v. Macomber37 as inapposite, and distinguished the nontaxable
stock dividend in that case on three grounds. First, a stock dividend
is evidence of an antecedent increase in the value of the stockholder's
capital interest, rather than a contemporaneous quid pro quo increase.
Second, a stock dividend is merely bookkeeping that does not affect
the aggregate assets of the corporation or its outstanding liabilities.
Third, after a stock dividend the stockholders retain an equal interest
in the same investment, rather than an equal interest in a substantially
different investment.3 The court gave recognition to the fact that
the pro rata ownership of the shareholders remained constant, but
concluded that, since the corporation was a substantially different
corporation after the transaction (its net worth having increased
due to the decrease in liabilities), the shareholders had received some-
thing of value when they received the stock. The increase in net worth
upon which the court relied in distinguishing the stock distribution
of the principal case from the nontaxable stock dividend of Macomber
was not a consequence of the stock issuance, but resulted from the debt
could disallow such deductions as not being "ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year. ... " INT. REV. CODE F 1954, § 162 (a).
^'E.g., interest on mortgages, notes, and bonds.
x252 U.S. 189 (1920). s338 F.2d at 927.
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cancellation. Merely by cancelling debts at a time prior to stock distri-
bution or not distributing any stock, parties in future transactions may
avoid this aspect of the non-qualifying results of the principal case.
The court did not cite section 305-a of the Code, which provides
that "gross income does not include the amount of any distribution
made by a corporation to its shareholders, with respect to the stock
of such corporation, in its stock .... " This section may not apply to
stock received by creditors or employees who happen to be share-
holders as well.3" Although the transaction in the principal case was
categorized as an exchange of stock for salary claims,40 it may also
be viewed as a cancellation resulting in a contribution to capital
followed by a stock distribution to the taxpayers as shareholders.
If the latter interpretation is unacceptable, parties in subsequent
transactions may again avoid disqualification merely by separating
in time the cancellation and stock issuance transactions.
Satisfied that the stock distribution did not fall within Macomber,
the court went on to conclude that the issued stock was compensation,
and therefore taxable income under sections 61-a(1) of the Code
and 1.61-2 (d) (4) of the Regulations. In factually similar cases, courts
have refused to look merely at form and have held that such pro
rata stock distributions are nontaxable events." In Joy M3g. Co. v.
See H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. AS1 (1954):
Where mention is made of an issuance or a distribution "with respect to stock"
in this section... such phrase means the issuance or distribution to a holder
of such stock by reason of his rights as a holder of such stock ....
BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 172
(1959); Note, Application of Eisner v. Macomber to Pro Rata Stock Distributions in
Payment of Salaries: an Opportunity for Tax Manipulation, 64 YALE L. J. 929, 933
(1955).
'0 338 F.2d at 925.
"
1 In Deloss E. Daggit, 23 T.C. 31 (1954), acq., 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 4, Note, Appli-
cation of Eisner v. Macomber to Pro Rata Stock Distributions in Payment of
Salaries: an Opportunity for Tax Manipulation, 64 YALE L. J. 929, 933 (1955), the
two principal stockholders received a pro rata distribution of stock for services
rendered to the corporation and reported the stock as income. In a deficiency suit
brought by the Commissioner, who argued that the shareholders had not properly
valuated the stock received, the Tax Court held that the distribution was nontaxable
under Macomber. In Benjamin Josephson, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mfem. 788 (1947), the
president and sole shareholder forgave accrued salary claims, the corporation in-
creased capital stock, and a stock dividend was declared-all within seventeen days.
In issuing the stock, the corporation debited the salary accrued account and credited
the capital stock account. The Commissioner argued that the transaction was a sham,
that there was neither a forgiveness nor a stock dividend, but rather that the stock
had been issued in payment of salary and therefore was includable in the gross in-
come of the shareholder-creditor. The court rejected this argument, stating, id. at
789:
His wealth was not increased by the issuance of the 200 additional shares. The
issuance of such shares to him did not constitute income to him within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, regardless of whether
it was a stock dividend or for salary. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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Commissioner,42 a decision not cited in the principal case, the court
rejected the Commissioner's argument that stock received by a parent
corporation for services rendered to its wholly-owned subsidiary was
taxable income, stating:
After such a transaction is fully executed, the parent has more shares
of stock than before and the value of its holdings has been increased
by whatever economic benefit the subsidiary has realized from the
parent's services. But it is also true that before such a transaction, no
less than after, all the stock of the subsidiary belongs to the parent.
Therefore, the increase in the total value of the parent's stock caused
by the parent's services is the same whether the subsidiary does or does
not issue additional stock to the parent. In substance the services ren-
dered by the parent have amounted to a capital contribution to the
subsidiary.
While the services of the parent enrich the subsidiary, the additional
stock... in [the] subsidiary does not and cannot in any way enrich the
parent. The parent obtains an economic advantage in the increased
value of its wholly owned subsidiary, but the value is created directly
by the parent's services. It is not a realized gain and its character tax-
wise is not affected by the issuance of additional stock of the subsidiary.
Here, as in the cases which apply the doctrine of Eisner v. Macomber,
the peculiar circumstances under which additional stock is issued to a
stockholder prevent the.., transfer of the additional paper from amount-
ing to a realization of gain.43
The reasoning of the court in Joy is sound, given the realization con-
cept of Macomber. In determining the tax consequences of a pro
rata stock distribution a court must ascertain whether "the distribu-
tion... constituted a realized gain to the shareholder, or changed 'only
the form, not the essence,' of his capital investment."44 Since the share-
holders in the principal case owned the entire enterprise both before
and after the "cancellation-stock issuance" transaction, it is unclear
how the stock issuance alone could be anything other than a change
of form. The real party benefiting from the transactions was the
corporation, and it was the party, if any, which should have been
taxed by the court.
42230 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1956), 70 HARV. L. RP.v. 560 (1957), affirming 23 T.C.
1082 (1955).
'
3 d. at 742.
" Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955) (speaking
to the issue of the Court's endeavor in Macomber to determine the taxability of a
stock dividend).
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